No agreement was reached on the text to be presented at Cancun in November, and the Bonn August talks are now the last chance to find a compromise (the Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) – who drafted the text – asked the Parties to compile a revised version by the next negotiating session).
All the countries that didn’t agree to the Copenhagen Accord (Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, Venezuela, Tuvalu) were still expressing the same claims - Bolivia was in the forefront, taking an almost obstructive stance, while Cuba didn’t actually intervene in the negotiations - decreasing the currently low chances of reaching an agreement in Cancun (Table).
Their opposition reflects several interests, which are often part of a broader foreign agenda. Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua share an ideological affinity, which is heavily characterized by anti-U.S. rhetoric and climate change has become part of it (even if they actually blame all the developed world for being responsible for CC). After Copenhagen, Cuba’s representative accused Obama of behaving like an “imperial chief” displaying “arrogant” behavior aimed at quashing developing countries”; just as the Bolivian representative accused the U.S. of spending trillions of dollars on exporting terrorism to Iraq and Afghanistan and establishing military bases in Latin America while offering a “ridiculous” figure ($10 billion) per year for developing nations. They are all also members of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), which was created as an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) proposed by the U.S. as an extension of NAFTA. They all share development concerns (and ALBA led, for example, to Venezuela’s favourable oil sales to Cuba) and consider the developed world responsible for a “climate debt”. Among the countries who refuse to agree to the Accord, the coral atoll nation Tuvalu is the only one which seems to have “good” reasons, since it is afraid of disappearing and since it is the first country with climate refugees. Venezuela hosts one of the largest non-conventional resources reserves, whose extraction leads to high emissions and has huge environmental impact, but the country is investing in it due to a decrease in conventional oil reserves.
Bolivia seems to embrace a leading role among those who have rejected the Accord not only because Morales’ election constituted the triumph of the “anti-imperialist governments”, but also because the Bolivian government is openly challenging the Copenhagen process offering a new mainstream for climate change. Bolivia is trying to appealingly re-elaborate the developed vs developing worlds divide and The World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth held in Cochabamba in April (re-christened the “Woodstock” of climate change summits) is part of this process. The text produced there, the “People’s Agreement”, which was presented during the last Bonn talks, non only reflects the 6 countries’ complaints and targets, but also proposes, for example, a world referendum to consult populations on climate change; the recognition and revalorization of indigenous roots of all humanity and full respect for the rights of indigenous peoples; a United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth; an analysis of the structural causes of climate change (generated by the capitalist system); the protection and recognition of the rights and needs of those forced to migrate due to climate change. Bolivia is also a lithium-rich country and an intensive use of this material is now being discussed, for instance for electric cars. Bolivia’s behaviour could therefore also be interpreted as a commercial strategy: the more developing countries will have to reduce their emissions the more they will need lithium. Nevertheless, playing with unreasonable targets like the 1ºC only jeopardizes the achievement of an international agreement and therefore the benefits for the country.
While challenging the Accord Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, Venezuela, Tuvalu are indeed not proposing realistic targets. The 1ºC aim is simply unrealistic because it correspond to a concentration of 350 ppm CO2-eq which to be reached, given the current 430 ppm concentration, would require reducing emissions to zero now and at the same time absorb 80 ppm CO2-eq, namely the amount produced during the last 50 years, which would take another 50 years to absorb (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report WGI, Cap. 10, Table 10.8, pg. 826). Therefore, insisting on this target only hampers negotiations, prevents reaching an agreement and creates a stalemate which benefits no one.
| Issue | Copenhagen (Dec. 2009) | Bonn (June 2010) |
| 1°C Emission Target | Bolivia, Venezuela, Tuvalu (any rise over 1.5°C not negotiable) | Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Tuvalu |
| Emission reduction | Bolivia: ↓ 49% (from 1990) by 2020 | Bolivia: ↓ 50% (from 1990) by 2017 |
| DCs responsibility and "climate debt" | Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela | Bolivia, Nicaragua |
| Finance: 6% DCs' GDP | Bolivia | Bolivia, Nicaragua |
| Finance: no market approach and only public funds | Bolivia, Venezuela | Bolivia, Nicaragua |
| No democratic procedures and transparency | Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Sudan, Tuvalu | Bolivia (abuse of the flexibility mechanism, profits for DCs) Venezuela (Secretary General's High Level Advisory Group on CC Finance is a process outside the UNFCCC with limited participation) |
| Legally binding | Bolivia, Tuvalu | Bolivia, Venezuela, Tuvalu |
Source: IISD Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP 15 and SB 30
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